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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Michael Francis Moore pied guilty to one count of
felony burglary. He received a unified sentence of five years, with one year fixed.
On appeal, Mr. Moore asserts that the district court erred in failing to order a
mental health evaluation of Mr. Moore prior to sentencing.

Mr. Moore also contends

that the district court abused its discretion in failing to reduce his sentence in light of
Mr. Moore's mental health issues and other mitigating factors, as well as the additional
information submitted in conjunction with his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion.
Mr. Moore requests that the judgment of conviction and sentence be vacated, a
mental health evaluation ordered, and a new sentencing hearing conducted.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On the morning of June 25, 2009, law enforcement officials responded to a
shoplifting report.

(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter,

PSI), 1 p.2.)

Mr. Moore was intoxicated and had shoplifted a six pack of Mike's Hard Lemonade2
from a drugstore.

(PSI, p.2.) As Mr. Moore was leaving the store, he struck a loss

prevention specialist who tried to detain him. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Moore was charged by
Information with one count of burglary, one count of petit theft, and one count of
battery. 3 (R., pp.24-25.)

PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file containing
the PSI, and all included attachments. These documents will hereinafter be described
as the "PSI" for ease of reference.
2 Mike's Hard Lemonade is an alcoholic beverage.
3 Mr. Moore was initially charged with a single count of robbery (R., pp.6-7), but the
robbery charge was subsequently amended to burglary and two new crimes were
added-petit theft and misdemeanor battery. (R., pp.17-18.)
1

1

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Moore pied guilty to the shoplifting burglary
charge and the other charges were dismissed. (12/01/09 Tr., p.2, L.s.2-13; R., pp.3940, 41-4 7.) Although the terms of the plea agreement provided that the State agreed to
recommend

probation,

the

plea

agreement

also

provided

that

the

State's

recommendation would be conditioned upon, inter alia, the defendant having no failures
to appear. (12/01/09 Tr., p.3, Ls.8-12; R., pp.42-47.) The district court ordered a PSI
and a substance abuse evaluation prior to sentencing. (12/01/09 Tr., p.14, L.8 - p.15,
L.1.)
Mr. Moore failed to appear at sentencing and the district court issued a warrant.
(R., pp.48-50.)

Mr. Moore was arrested on the warrant. (R., p.50.) The sentencing

hearing was continued several times to allow Mr. Moore sufficient time to read the PSl. 4

(See generally 3/16/10 Tr.; see generally 3/23/10 Tr.; 3/30/10 Tr., p.3, Ls.6-10.) During
one such hearing on March 23, 2010, Mr. Moore's counsel advised the district court
that, at the time of the incident, Mr. Moore was experiencing symptoms of his mental
illness and, based on a recent conversation with him at the jail, she believed that his
mental health issues likely played a "very big role" in the incident. (3/23/10 Tr., p.10,
Ls.4-9.) Defense counsel asked the court to order a mental health evaluation. (3/23/10
Tr., p.10, Ls.13-16.)

The district court reviewed Mr. Moore's mental health history

contained in the records attached to the PSI and noted that:
Well, a pure evaluation - I have the benefit of the report from
lntermountain hospital of February 28 th of '05, the discharge, which lays
out the diagnosis on Axis I with schizoaffective disorder with alcohol and
polysubstance abuse, along with some other things.
And then we have a psychiatric evaluation that was done by Saint
Alphonsus on - I love the way they hid the dates of these things. Well,
4

Mr. Moore advised the court that he does not read very well and needed additional
time to review the PSI. (PSI, p.56.)

2

again, this is in August of '08. There is a - it doesn't read the same,
necessarily, as a court-ordered evaluation, but I think it tells me what I'm
going to find out from a court-ordered evaluation, that the defendant does
have a history of schizophrenic-type mental illness.
So I'm not inclined to continue this for mental health - I mean, the records
go back - I was just trying to remember how far back they went. And they
go back clear to 2002. I'm looking at one in January of '04 where he
presents at the emergency department with histories of hearing voices
and definitely psychotic state. So, Counsel, I'm not inclined to [order a
mental health evaluation].
(3/23/10Tr., p.11, L.8-p.12, L.3.)
At the sentencing hearing the State asked to be released from its obligations
under the plea agreement, as Mr. Moore had failed to appear for his sentencing
hearing. 5

(3/30/10 Tr., p.3, Ls.3-18.)

The defense did not object, but asked that

Mr. Moore be placed on probation with mental health and substance abuse treatment.
(R., pp.59-60; 3/30/10 Tr., p.7, L.24- p.8, L.15.)
The district court imposed upon Mr. Moore a sentence of five years, with one
year fixed. (3/30/10 Tr., p.12, Ls.2-3; R., pp.61-63, 72-74.) Thereafter, Mr. Moore filed
a timely I.C.R. 35 Motion for Reduction of Sentence.

(R., p.70-71.)

Although

Mr. Moore provided new information for the district court to consider in support of his
I.C.R. 35 motion for leniency, the district court denied Mr. Moore's motion. (R, pp.8688.)

After a post-conviction action, the district court re-entered the Judgement of

Conviction on November 19, 2012, thereby restoring Mr. Moore's right to appeal.
(R., pp.90-91.) On November 29, 2012, Mr. Moore filed a notice of appeal timely from
the re-entered Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.92-94.)

Mr. Moore was homeless and "living on the streets" for more than a month before he
failed to appear for his sentencing hearing. (PSI, p.13.)
5

3

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Moore's motion for a mental health
evaluation?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Moore's Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence in light of the new
information offered by Mr. Moore?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Failed To Order A Mental Health Evaluation

A.

Introduction
Mr. Moore asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his

request for a mental health evaluation when his mental health was a significant factor at
sentencing. Mr. Moore had a history of six psychiatric hospitalizations and the district
court had been advised that, at the time of the incident, Mr. Moore was experiencing
symptoms of his mental illness. Therefore, he submits that he is entitled to have his
conviction vacated, a mental health evaluation ordered, and a new sentencing hearing
held.

B.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Moore's Request For A Mental
Health Evaluation
"After the determination of guilt it is essential that the court receive adequate

information about the defendant before handing down the sentence. Individualizing
sentences is impossible without such information." State v. McFarland, 125 Idaho 876,
878 (Ct. App. 1994) (internal citations omitted). Before imposing a sentence, the court
may appoint a psychologist to examine and report on the mental condition of the
defendant. See I.C. § 19-2522; I.C.R. 32(d); McFarland, 125 Idaho 878-79. The legal
standards governing the district court's decision whether to order a psychological
evaluation and report are contained in I.C. §19-2522:
(1) If there is reason to believe the mental condition of the defendant will
be a significant factor at sentencing and for good cause shown, the court
shall appoint at least one (1) psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to
examine and report upon the mental condition of the defendant.
5

(3) The report of the examination shall include the following:
(a) A description of the nature of the examination;
(b) A diagnosis, evaluation or prognosis of the mental condition of
the defendant;
(c) An analysis of the degree of the defendant's illness or defect
and level of functional impairment;
(d) A consideration of whether treatment is available for the
defendant's mental condition;
( e) An analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or
nontreatment;
(f) A consideration of the risk of danger which the defendant may
create for the public if at large.
"The requirements of I.C. § 19-2522 are complimented by Idaho Criminal Rule

32 which specifies the elements to be included in the presentence report. These
elements include information on the health of the defendant where relevant to the
sentencing decision,

!.C.R.

32(b)(8),

and,

where appropriate,

the presentence

investigator's analysis and recommendation regarding a psychological examination,
!.C.R. 32(b)(10)." State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 822 (2010).
The district court has discretion to deny a defendant's request for a psychological
evaluation. State v. Collins, 144 Idaho 408, 409 (Ct. App. 2007). However, with any
discretionary decision, the district court must act within the bounds of its discretion,
consistent with applicable legal principles.

State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820, 823

(Ct. App. 2008). The applicable legal standard for reviewing a district court's decision to
deny a psychological evaluation is governed by I.C. § 19-2522 (1 ). State v. Craner, 137
Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 2002).

6

A district court is required to consider a defendant's mental condition, if it is a
significant factor at sentencing.

I.C. § 19-2522.

Idaho Code Section 19-2522(1)

provides: "[i]f there is reason to believe the mental condition of the defendant will be a
significant factor at sentencing and for good cause shown, the court shall appoint at
least one ... psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine and report upon the
mental condition of the defendant." I.C. § 19-2522(1). "The language of the statute is
mandatory, requiring that the trial court obtain a psychological evaluation whenever
there is reason to believe that the defendant's mental condition will be of significance for
the determination of an appropriate sentence." State v. Coonts, 137 Idaho 150, 152
(Ct. App. 2002). The appellate courts have found error in a district court's refusal to
order a psychological evaluation prior to sentencing when a mental evaluation is clearly
necessary. State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820, 823 (Ct. App. 2008).
In State v. Hanson, 152 Idaho 314 (2012), the defendant requested a
psychological evaluation prior to sentencing. Hanson, 152 Idaho at 318. The district
court denied the request, finding, inter alia, that a psychological evaluation was not
necessary because it did not believe that the additional information provided by a
psychological evaluation would be helpful at sentencing. Id. After the Idaho Court of
Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court for a
presentence psychological evaluation and resentencing, the Idaho Supreme Court
granted review.

Id.

The Hanson Court reviewed the district court's decision for an

abuse of discretion recognizing that the psychological evaluation was mandatory if
"there is reason to believe the mental condition of the defendant would be a significant
factor at sentencing." Id. at 318.

7

The Hanson Court found that the record demonstrated that the defendant's
mental condition was a significant factor at sentencing and reversed the district court's
denial of Hanson's request for a psychological evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522
and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at 319-320. The Idaho Supreme
Court held:
[W]hen the record showed a defendant with a substantial history of serious
mental illness, the defendant's mental condition will be a significant factor in
determining an appropriate sentence and I .C. § 19-2522 requires the sentencing
court to obtain a psychological evaluation prior to sentencing. 6

Hanson, 152 Idaho at 320 (emphasis added).
Mr. Moore suffers from serious mental health problems for which he was not
being treated at the time of this incident.

His mental health issues were so apparent

that the PSI investigator recommended that Mr. Moore be screened for entry into mental
health court. (PSI, p.19.) Defense counsel also asked that Mr. Moore be screened for
mental health court.

(3/16/10 Tr., p.4, Ls.2-12.)

However, the State and the district

court opposed such a screening, and there was some concern that he may not be
eligible due to the type of crime he had pied guilty to. (3/23/10 Tr., p.10, Ls.10-13.)
Defense counsel then requested a mental health evaluation pursuant to
I.C. § 19-2522. (3/23/10 Tr., p.10, Ls.13-16.) The district court noted that it had a copy
of a February 28, 2005 report from lntermountain Hospital which set out Mr. Moore's
Axis I diagnosis, and an evaluation from Saint Alphonsus dated August of 2008, and
commented that it had records dating back to 2002. (3/23/10 Tr., p.11, Ls.8-25.) The
district court concluded that the 2008 psychiatric evaluation done by Saint Alphonsus

6

The Hanson Court did set forth an exception-where an evaluation under I.C. § 192524 has been ordered and the resulting report satisfies the requirements of I.C. §192522. Id. at n.2. Such is not the case here, as the report ordered pursuant to I.C. § 192524 analyzed only Mr. Moore's substance abuse.
8

told the court what it would have found out from a court-ordered evaluation-that the
defendant has a history of schizophrenic-type mental illness-and denied Mr. Moore's
request for a mental health evaluation. (3/23/10 Tr., p.11, L.14- p.12, L.3.) However,
the district court relied on the information contained in a two-page report that was two
years old, and which did not provide all of the information required by Idaho Code§ 192522(3). (R., pp.150-151.) The district court admitted that "it doesn't read the same,
necessarily, as a court-ordered evaluation, but I think it tells me what I'm going to find
out from a court-ordered evaluation, that the defendant does have history of
schizophrenic-type mental illness." (3/23/10 Tr., p.11, Ls.17-21.) Notably, the August
2008 report by Saint Alphonsus was less than two pages long and did not reflect any
analysis of the defendant's level of functional impairment, or any analysis of the relative
risks and benefits of treatment or nontreatment, or a consideration of the risk of danger
which the defendant may create for the public if at large. (R., pp.150-151.)
The information statutorily required to be contained in the evaluation is not just
what mental illness the defendant had been previously diagnosed with, but also:
(a) A description of the nature of the examination;
(b) A diagnosis, evaluation or prognosis of the mental condition of
the defendant;
(c) An analysis of the degree of the defendant's illness or defect
and level of functional impairment;
(d) A consideration of whether treatment is available for the
defendant's mental condition;
(e) An analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or
nontreatment;
(f) A consideration of the risk of danger which the defendant may
create for the public if at large.
1.C. § 19-2522(3).

9

In this case, Mr. Moore's mental condition was a significant factor for determining
an appropriate sentence. The district court was aware of Mr. Moore's lengthy history of
serious mental illness.

Mr.

Moore had previously undergone six psychiatric

hospitalizations for mental illness. (PSI, p.150.) The district court had before it well
over 100 pages of records that reflected a diagnosis of schizophrenia with delusions
and hallucinations and which also documented depression and suicidal ideations.
The district court commented at sentencing regarding Mr. Moore's mental health
problems, "I acknowledge that you have mental health problems. But there are people
with mental health problems that don't commit crimes. They get on their medicines and
they stay on them." (3/30/W Tr., p.11, Ls.9-13.) The district court then imposed its
sentence of five years unified, with one year fixed, telling Mr. Moore that the sentence
was "in light of your need to get stabilized on your medication and get some structure."
(3/30/10 Tr., p.11, L.25- p.12, L.5.)
In this case, the record is replete with indications that Mr. Moore suffered from
severe mental health issues and those issues were affecting him on the date of the
incident. Further, Mr. Moore, when asked about his mental health by the presentence
investigator, said that he believes he would benefit from mental health counseling.
(PSI, p.15.) Additionally, Mr. Moore's defense counsel, after speaking to him at the jail
while he was reviewing his PSI, revealed that, "at the time of this incident, Mr. Moore
was experiencing hallucinations, symptoms of his schizophrenia ... [a]nd it has come to
my attention that his mental health issues probably played a very big role in this
incident." (3/23/10Tr., p.9, L.14-p.10, L.9.)
Mr. Moore's mental health should have been a significant mitigating factor at
sentencing, but the district court may have viewed Mr. Moore's acts attributable to his
10

mental health condition as aggravating facts suggesting that Mr. Moore could not be
compliant on probation. At sentencing, the district court commented on the fact that
Mr. Moore failed to appear for his sentencing hearing: "And for whatever reason you
just decided not to show. It wasn't like you committed some other big crime or fled the
country or something. You were just back on the street drinking and getting in trouble."
(3/30/10 Tr., p.10, Ls.19-23.) Had the district court obtained a mental health evaluation
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522, the court could have referred to the evaluation to assist the
court in determining the risk Mr. Moore posed to the community. Mr. Moore's mental
health issues were raised both prior to his guilty plea, several times prior to sentencing,
and during sentencing.

Further, the district court relied on Mr. Moore's actions

surrounding the incident when fashioning his sentence.
Notably, when Mr. Moore was seen in 2003, he spoke to his treatment provider
about his auditory and visual hallucinations and expressed his concern that, because of
his hallucinations, he did not know what was real and what was not real and that he
feared that he was going to end up backhanding someone and hurting someone. (PSI,
p.192.) In 2009, in this case, Mr. Moore backhanded a store clerk who was trying to
stop him from shoplifting. (PSI, p.2.) Because only a portion of the information required
by I.C. § 19-2522 was available to the district court at sentencing, the district court
should have ordered a full mental health evaluation as mandated by I.C. § 19-2522.
Additionally, while the district court stated that it intended to rely upon the 2008
report conducted at Saint Alphonsus, a report from 2005 indicated that Mr. Moore was
"gravely disabled with auditory hallucination and delusional" (PSI, p.164), therefore,
even though the February 28, 2008 report indicated that Mr. Moore's "judgment was
intact" (PSI, p.150), the degree of Mr. Moore's illness was not always consistent from
11

year to year, necessitating a mental health evaluation to allow the district court to
assess, inter alia, the factors listed in I.C. § 19-2522, including (1)(c): "An analysis of
the degree of the defendant's illness or defect and level of functional impairment.'' 7
The limited information before the district court at sentencing does not function
as an adequate substitute for an I.C. § 19-2522 evaluation. As stated above, the August
2008 evaluation performed through Saint Alphonsus did not meet the requirements of
I.C. § 19-2522.

Although the substance abuse evaluation mentioned Mr. Moore's

mental health, it did not inform the court on all of the I.C. § 19-2522 factors, such as
consideration of whether treatment is available for a defendant's mental condition, the
relative risks and benefits of treatment or nontreatment, and the risk of danger that the
defendant presents to the public. (PSI, pp.22-31.) Therefore, there never was a mental
health evaluation which complied with the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522.
In sum, where the district court considered Mr. Moore's mental health when
sentencing him, thus indicating that Mr. Moore's mental health was a significant factor at
sentencing, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Moore's request and refused to
order a mental health evaluation pursuant I.C. § 19-2522.
Mr. Moore's mental condition was a significant factor at sentencing. The court
acted outside the bounds of its discretion and contrary to Idaho Code § 19-2522 when it
denied Mr. Moore's request for a mental health evaluation. The district court's judgment
of conviction should be vacated, a mental health examination ordered, and a new
sentencing hearing conducted.

Additionally, Mr. Moore's symptoms varied each time he was treated. On May 23,
2004, Mr. Moore was admitted to the Saint Alphonsus emergency room for
hallucinations. (PSI, p.178.) He had been hearing voices that told him "he is a piece of
crap." (PS I, p.178.) At that time Mr. Moore reported that the voices were overpowering
7

12

11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Moore's Rule 35 Motion
For A Reduction Of Sentence In Light Of The New Information Presented At The
Rule 35 Hearing
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent,
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original
sentence was reasonable." Id. "If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced,
the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional
information presented with the motion for reduction." Id.
Mr. Moore asserts that the district court failed to properly consider the mitigating
factors that exist in his case.
Mr. Moore has had a difficult life. 8 Mr. Moore's parents were severe alcoholics
and his mother physically abused him. (PSI, p.11.) He was placed in foster care at age
12 or 13 but returned to his family a few years later. (PSI, p.11.) Mr. Moore's mother
and older brother introduced him to alcohol and drugs at age 9. (PSI, pp.11, 15.) When
Mr. Moore was 18 or 19 years old, he was pushed out of a moving vehicle and landed
on his head, causing brain and spinal damage such that he has both short and long-

him and the voices were the worst they had ever been since he first started hearing
them at age 12. (PSI, p.178.)
8 The district court noted at sentencing:
The first thing that struck me in going through this PSI was what insurmountable
obstacles this defendant had as a child. Alcoholic parents, a mother that beat
him living on the streets and shelters. Placed in foster care apparently for some
time during his early adolescence. And then a lifetime of drugs and crimes.
(3/30/10 Tr., p.9, Ls.18-25.)
13

term memory loss. (PSI, p.15.) At the time of the incident he was living at the Boise
Mission homeless shelter, and had been homeless for most of the last 15 years. (PSI,
pp.18, 105, 108.) Mr. Moore is unable to maintain steady employment due to his mental
health conditions, and told the presentence investigator that because he has paranoid
schizophrenia, he thinks that most people hate him. (PSI, p.14.) Mr. Moore also told
his presentence investigator that he prefers to be alone because he "hear[s] voices and
think[s] people are plotting against [him]." (PSI, p.12.) One of Mr. Moore's goals is to
be able to get a good regime of mental health medications so he stops feeling paranoid
all of the time. (PSI, p.18.)
Mr. Moore has been diagnosed with mental health conditions-schizophrenia
and bi-polar disorder--in 2004. (3/30/10 Tr., p.7, Ls.4-5; PSI, p.15.) However, he had a
history of auditory hallucinations beginning at age 9 or 10. (PSI, p.105.) Mr. Moore
intermittently received treatment for his schizophrenia from the Idaho Department of
Health & Welfare. (PSI, pp.90-111.) He has had multiple psychiatric hospitalizations
since age 14. (PSI, pp.103., 107) Mr. Moore first received mental health treatment for
depression when he was 13 years old, from State Hospital North.

(PSI, pp.71-72.)

Mr. Moore has been treated for his mental illness at the St. Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center Psychiatric Unit and lntermountain State Hospital in the past.

(PSI, p.15.)

Mr. Moore had not been taking his medication and had been drinking alcohol heavily in
the past several months prior to his arrest. (PSI, p.15.) Prior to this incident, Mr. Moore
had not seen a mental health professional since 2008. (3/23/10 Tr., p.11, Ls.14-18;

14

PSI, p.15.) During his incarceration in county jail just prior to his sentencing on this
charge, he was disoriented and having active hallucinations. 9 (PSI, p.117.)
Further, Mr. Moore was experiencing the symptoms of his afflictions, including
hallucinations, at the time he committed the shoplifting burglary. (3/30/10 Tr., p.7, Ls.78.) Mr. Moore had not been taking his mental health medications at the time of the
incident and was self-medicating, using alcohol. (3/30/10 Tr., p.6, Ls.18-20.) The Idaho
Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the trial court to
consider a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho
573, 581 (1999).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered
as a mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v.
Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982).

In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a sentence

based on Nice's lack of prior record and the fact that "the trial court did not give proper
consideration of the defendant's alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing
defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem."
Id. at 91. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that ingestion of drugs and

alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct, could be a
mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 (1981). The majority of
Mr. Moore's criminal activity has been while under the influence of alcohol. (PSI, pp.39.) Further, Mr. Moore never received mental health treatment while growing up and
instead was taught how to self-medicate by his family members. (3/30/1 O Tr., p. 7, Ls.9-

9

Mr. Moore did not know where he was (jail), and at times he believed that he was at
the supermarket buying food (pizza), or at Starbuck's with a lady sitting by him drinking
coffee, and he also told staff that there were puppies on his bed. (PSI, pp.117-118,
140.)
15

12, p.6, L.20- p.7, L.3; PSI, p.15.) Mr. Moore realizes that he is an alcoholic and wants
to stop drinking and seek treatment. 10 (PSI, p.16.)
Additionally, Mr. Moore has expressed his remorse for committing the instant
offense. Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant expresses
remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. State v. Shideler, 103
Idaho 593, 595 (1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204,209 (Ct. App. 1991). In State v.
Alberts, the Idaho Court of Appeals reduced the sentence imposed "[i]n light of Alberts'

expression of remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to
accept treatment and other positive attributes of his character." Id. 121 Idaho at 204.
See also State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982) (reducing sentence of first time

offender who accepted responsibility for his acts and had the support of his family in his
rehabilitation efforts); State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988)
(reducing sentence of first time offender who accepted responsibility, expressed
remorse, and had been of good character before the offense at issue) reversed on other
grounds, State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295 (1990).

Mr. Moore accepted responsibility for his actions and expressed his remorse
before he was sentenced:
I am taking full responsibility for my action that brought me here. I would
like to apologize to Rite Aid and its employees for any problems I might
have caused them and taking their merchandise. I would like to thank you
again, sir, for giving me some continuances so I can study the PSI. Thank
you sir.
(3/30/1 O Tr., p.9, Ls.3-10.)

Mr. Moore told the presentence investigator that he felt

"stupid and ashamed" for committing the crime. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Moore also wanted the

Mr. Moore told the presentence investigator, "I drink too much "and that he would "go
to any treatment programs offered." (PSI, p.16.)
10
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court to know that he realizes that he has to stop his criminal lifestyle as it is getting him
nowhere. (PSI, p.18.) He wants to become a productive member of society and be a
better father to his 9 year old son. (PSI, pp.13, 18.)
Mr. Moore asserts that had the district court properly considered his remorse,
desire for treatment, and mental health issues, it would have reduced his sentence
pursuant to his Rule 35 motion. He further asserts that his sentence should have been
reduced in light of the new information submitted in conjunction with his Rule 35 motion.
In support of his motion for a sentence reduction, Mr. Moore submitted
information regarding his time in custody.

(R., pp.78-83.)

Since his sentencing,

Mr. Moore has used his time in prison to better himself. He has completed a series of
classes-anger management, MRT and relapse prevention. (R., p.80.)
Based on the foregoing, in addition to the mitigating evidence before the district
court at the time of sentencing, it is clear that the district court abused its discretion in
failing to reduce Mr. Moore's sentence in response to his Rule 35 motion.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Moore respectfully requests that this Court remand his case to the district
court for a mental health evaluation and a new sentencing hearing. Alternatively, he
requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 8 th day of October, 2013.

SALLM. COOLEY
J
Deputy State Appellate "Jiublic Defender
r
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